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CGST Act IGST Act UTGST Act GST (Compensation to the States) Act Addendum to the GST Rate Schedule - 03.06.2017 101st Constitution Amendment Act, 2016 Addendum to the GST Rate Schedule - 18.05.2017 GST Compensation Cess Rates Decided in the GST Council Meeting held on 18.05.2017 Chapter Wise Rate wise GST Schedule - 03.06.2017 Chapter wise GST Rate Schedule for Goods Decided in the GST Council Meeting held on 18.05.2017 Revised Threshold for Composition Scheme - 11.06.2017 IGST Exemptions Approved by the GST Council - 11.06.2017 GST Rates Approved by the GST Council - 11.06.2017 Service Tax Exemptions in GST IGST Exemption, Concession List - 03.06.2017 Composition - Rules Valuation Rules ITC - Rules Invoice, Debit & Credit Notes - Rules Payment - Rules Refund - Rules Registration - Rules Return- Rules Transition Rules Proposed CTD Document Accounts and Record Rules GST rate Schedule for Services List of Services under Reverse Charge Classification Scheme for Services Under GST Decisions Taken by the GST Council in the 16th Meeting - 11.06.2017
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CIO 1965 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1965-10-05]
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CIO 1964 SC 2
[Date of Order: 1964-11-23]
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STO 1964 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1964-10-28]

Sales Tax : Interpretation of terms : If a process or activity is so integrally related to the ultimate manufacture of goods so that without that process or activity manufacture may, even if theoretically possible, by commercially inexpedient goods intended for use in the process or activity as specified in Rule 13 will qualify for special treatment. This is not to say that every category of goods "in connection with" manufacture of, or "in relation to" manufacture, or which facilitates the conduct of the business of manufacture will be included within Rule 13.(Para 9). The expression "in the manufacture" takes in within its compass, all processes which are directly related to the actual production. Goods intended as equipment for use in the manufacture of goods for sale are expressly made admissible for specification. Drawing and photographic materials falling within the description of goods intended for use as "equipment" in the process of designing which is directly related to the actual production of goods and without which commercial production would be inexpedient must be regarded as goods intended for use "in the manufacture of goods."(Para 10).

Building materials used as raw materials for construction of "plant" cannot be said to be used as plant in the manufacture of goods : The Legislature has contemplated that the goods to qualify under Section 8(3)(b) must be intended for use as raw materials or as plant, or as equipment in the manufacture or processing of goods, and it cannot be said that building materials fall within this description. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the claim of the Company in that behalf.(Para 11). We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer be modified(Para 13).

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CEO 1964 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1964-07-31]
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STO 1963 Mad 1
[Date of Order: 1963-07-02]

Jurisdiction of Appellate Authority: When an appeal is filed before the Central Board of Revenue, the entire proceedings are taken out of the jurisdiction of the original tribunal which imposed the penalty and are brought entirely within the jurisdiction of the appellate Tribunal. After the disposal of the matter by the Appellate Tribunal, jurisdiction can be revived in the original Tribunal only if there are specific directions in the appellate order to that effect.

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CEO 1962 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1962-10-12]
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STO 1962 SC 2
[Date of Order: 1962-05-04]

Customs : Import : Confiscation of goods brought in violation of conditions of the licence : Jurisdiction of the Commissioner to adjudicate : The question is one of jurisdiction. The contention of the appellant is that under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act read with Section 182 of that Act under which the Collector of Customs is proceeding, he has jurisdiction only to decide whether goods have been imported contrary to the prohibition or restriction imposed by an order made under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1947 but he has no jurisdiction under these sections to decide any question of confiscation of goods for breach of a condition of a licence issued under such an order.(Para 11).

Collector has jurisdiction to decide whether there is breach of a condition of an order : To say that the breach of a condition is not a breach of an order is only to set up a defence that the goods cannot be confiscated for such a breach. Such a contention does not oust the jurisdiction of the Collector to decide whether the breach of a condition is a breach of an order, his decision, on the assumption that I have made, would be wrong but it would not be a decision made without jurisdiction. (Para 12). The statute clearly intended and it should be so read that these powers could be effectively exercised. Therefore the breach of a condition of a licence legitimately imposed in exercise of that power has to be read as a breach of the order by which the power was exercised and the condition imposed. It follows that the Collector has jurisdiction to decide whether there has been a breach of a condition of a licence and whether, therefore, confiscation should be ordered under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and further penalty imposed.(Para 17). It has, therefore, to be held that where an order passed under the Act authorises the imposition of a condition, a breach of the condition would be punishable as a breach of the order under the Act.(Para 19). The conditions in the licence have to be treated as conditions contained in an order issued under the Act of 1947 itself. Therefore, the breach of such a condition would amount to a contravention of an order restricting the import of goods. Such a contravention is clearly punishable under Section 167(8).(Para 20). Under the Sea Customs Act only the goods imported can be confiscated and therefore, the money now lying with the Presidency Magistrate cannot be confiscated. This argument is wholly untenable. The money represents the goods. The order for sale was made by the High Court with the consent of both the parties because the goods were deteriorating. Therefore there can be not doubt that the sale proceeds of the goods which could be confiscated, can also be confiscated.(Para 21). The first question is whether the petition filed by the appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of prohibition is maintainable in the circumstances of the case.(Para26). If on a true construction of the provisions of the said two sections the respondent has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings or make an inquiry under the said sections in respect of certain acts alleged to have been done by the appellants, the respondent can certainly be prohibited from proceeding with the same. We, therefore, reject first preliminary contention.(Para 27).

Power of supervision : Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenty power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer.(Para 29). It will be seen from this order that it does not provide for a condition in the licence that subsequent to the import the goods should not be sold. Condition (v) of cl. (a) only empowers the licensing authority to impose a condition from an administrative point of view. It cannot be suggested that the condition, with which we are now concerned, is a condition imposed from an administrative point of view, but it is a condition which affects the rights of parties.(Para 30).

Public notices are policy statements administratively made by the Government for public information : The respondent asserts that the said public notice is an order made in exercise of the power conferred on the Central Government under Section 3(1) of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants contends that public notices are not such orders but only information given to the public for their guidance.(Para 32). Orders made under Section 3 of the Act have statutory force, whereas public notices are policy statements administratively made by the Government for public information. Thus the infringement of a condition in the licence not to sell the goods imported to third parties is not an infringement of the order, and, therefore, the said infringement does not attract Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. (Para 33, 34). In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. There will be an order of prohibition restraining the Customs authority from proceeding with the inquiry under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.(Para 39).

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STO 1962 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1962-03-28]

Assumption of clandestine production : Collector holding that 11,606 maunds of sugar were short accounted for and that the accounts had not been properly kept was based on assumptions for which there no basis.(Para 3). It is well-known that the sugar content of sugarcane even grown in the same area is not constant but is variable according to the time of the year. Again it has to be borne in mind that the recovery of sugar must necessarily depend upon the milling performance. It cannot be assumed that even in an ordinarily well run factory the performance would be uniformly good or uniformly the same.(Para 11).

Natural factors responsible for lower production : The particular ratio upon which a part of the calculations of the Assistant Chemical Examiner was based is founded on analysis of Java cane and is, therefore, no guide for determination of the ratio in respect of Indian cane. However, the point raised is a highly technical one and counsel on neither side was able to throw any light upon it. This argument was not considered by the Collector or by the Central Board of Revenue or the Central Government. In the circumstances, the finding that 11,606 maunds of sugar were not accounted for by the appellant has been arrived at without any tangible evidence and is based only on inferences involving unwarranted assumptions. (Para 13).

Inferential finding can not frame charges : The other finding that the registers were not properly maintained as required by Rule 83 is also an inferential finding based upon the calculations made by the Assistant Chemical Examiner.(Para 14). The gross annual turnover of sugar manufactured in the factory is in the neighbourhood of 12 lakhs of maunds and the amount of excise duty the appellant pays to Government runs into about a crore of rupees per annum. It would therefore be a little far-fetched to infer that what happened at the time of the inspection was something more than an error occasioned perhaps by carelessness nor could it be said that this shows that there was a deliberate attempt on their part to evade payment of duty on a mere 11,606 maunds and amounting to less than a lakh of rupees. This is said not because an error due to carelessness in maintaining the registers properly as required by Rule 83 does not amount to a contravention of that rule; the only reason is that in a factory where the turnover of sugar is so considerable and the operations conducted in which the human element plays a significant part it would not be right to base calculations on the surmise that over filling of the tanks was being practised systematically.(Para 15). The order of the Central Government and the two tribunals below is quashed (Para 16).

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CEO 1962 SC 5
[Date of Order: 1962-02-28]
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CIO 1961 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1961-09-25]
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CEO 1960 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1960-09-27]
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CIO 1957 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1957-05-16]
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CIO 1954 Bom 1
[Date of Order: 1954-08-09]
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STO 1953 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1953-02-25]

Sales tax : Right of appeal : The amendment has placed a substantial restriction on the assessee's right of appeal cannot be disputed, for the amended section requires the payment of the entire assessed amount as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal. The question is whether the imposition of such a restriction by amendment of the section can affect the assessee's right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal was free from such restriction under the section as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.(Para 4).

It is a vested right : The right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in a party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance and such right could not be taken away except by an express provision or by necessary implication.(Para 5). Rights of appeal are not matter of procedure, and that the right to enter the superior Court is for the present purpose deemed to arise to a litigant before any decision has been given by the inferior Court. If the latter proposition be accepted, I can see no intermediate point at which to resist the conclusion that the right arises at the date of the suit.(Para 6).

Whether right of appeal can be affected by the new provision : There can be no doubt that the right of appeal has been affected by the new provision and in the absence of an express enactment this amendment cannot apply to proceedings pending at the date when the new amendment came into force. It is true that the appeal was filed after the Act came into force, but that circumstance is immaterial—for the date to be looked into for this purpose is the date of the original proceeding which eventually culminated in the appeal.(Para 8). To disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication.(Para 9). There can be no doubt that the new requirement "touches" the substantive right of appeal vested in the appellant. Nor can it be overlooked that such a requirement is calculated to interfere with or fetter, if not to impair or imperil, the substantive right. The right that the amended section gives a certainly less than the right which was available before. A provision which is calculated to deprive the appellant of the unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in procedure. Indeed the new requirement cannot be said merely to regulate the exercise of the appellant's pre-existing right but in truth whittles down the right itself and cannot be regarded as a mere rule of procedure.(Para 11). For the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself.

The pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed : The pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right. (Para 12). The appellant's appeal should not have been rejected on the ground that it was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the assessed tax. As the appellant did not admit that any amount was due by it, it was under the section as it stood previously entitled to file its appeal without depositing any sum of money. (Para 13).

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CIO 1951 Cal 1
[Date of Order: 1951-04-26]
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STO 1945 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1945-01-21]

Central Excise : State levies : Interpretation of statute : The term "duty of excise" is a somewhat flexible one : it may, no doubt, cover a tax on first and perhaps on other sales. So by parity of reasoning may the Federal Legislature impose a duty of excise upon the manufacture of excisable goods and the Provincial Legislature impose a tax upon the sale of the same goods when manufactured.(Para 9).The tax imposed by the Madras Act is not a duty of excise in the cloak of a tax on sales. Lacking the characteristic features of a duty of excise such as uniformity of incidence and discrimination in subject-matter, it is in its general scope and in its detailed provision a "tax on sales." Lordships are of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.(Para 11).


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STO 1942 SC 1
[Date of Order: 1942-05-08]

Central Excise : Levy on first sale of manufactured goods- : Interpretation: Ultra vires nature of Madras Act and certain rules made thereunder : The sum of Rs. 160-11-0 was demanded from the respondents by way of tax and paid by them under protest. The respondents then took proceedings in the Court of the District Munsif at Vizianagram for a declaration that the Madras Act and certain rules made thereunder were ultra vires the Madras Legislature and for an order directing a refund of the sum of Rs. 160-11-0 together with Rs. 3 interest thereon. The learned Munsif gave judgment in favour of the respondents on both points, holding that a tax on the first sale of goods manufactured in the Province was a duty of excise which the Madras Government were not competent to impose. There was an appeal to the District Court at Vizagapatam, but on the application of the Advocate-General of Madras, the appeal was transferred to the High Court. A Bench of the High Court, upheld the judgment of the lower Court; and it is from the High Court's decision that the present appeal emerges.(Para 3).

Duty of excise is to be imposed by Central Legislature & tax on the sale of goods by the Provincial Legislatures: They recognized that the expression "duty of excise" must be given a more restricted meaning than it might otherwise bear. On the other hand the fact that "duty of excise" is itself an expression of very general import is no reason at all for refusing to give to the expression "tax on sales" the meaning which it would ordinarily and naturally convey.(Para 6). The duties of excise which the Constitution Act assigns exclusively to the Central Legislature are, according to 1939 F.C.R. 18 duties levied upon the manufacturer or producer in respect of the manufacturer or production of the commodity taxed. The tax on the sale of goods which the Act assigns exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures, is a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of the goods. Plainly a tax levied on the first sale must in the nature of things be a tax on the sale by the manufacturer or producer; but it is levied upon him qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer. If the taxpayer who pays a sale tax is also a manufacturer or producer of commodities subject to a central duty of excise, there may no doubt be an overlapping in one sense, but there is no overlapping in law. The two taxes which he is called on to pay are economically two separate and distinct imposts. There is in theory nothing to prevent the Central Legislature from imposing a duty of excise on a commodity as soon as it comes into existence, no matter what happens to it afterwards, whether it be sold, consumed, destroyed or given away. A taxing authority will not ordinarily impose such a duty because it is much more convenient administratively to collect the duty (as in the case of most of the Excise Acts) when the commodity leaves the factory for the first time and also because the duty is intended to be an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer is to pass on to the ultimate consumer, which he could not do if the commodity had for example been destroyed in the factory itself. It is the fact of manufacture which attracts the duty, even though it may be collected later. The manufacturer or producer cannot of course sell his commodity unless he has first manufactured or produced it, but he is liable, if at all, to a sales tax because he sells and not because he manufactures or produces, and he would be free from liability if he chose to give away everything which came from his factory.

The power of the Provincial Legislatures: To levy a tax on the sale of goods extends to sales of every kind, whether first sales or not .(Para 7). Every tax on the sale of goods produced in India is in a sense an excise duty, whether the sale is the first, second or third, though an excise duty is not necessarily a tax on sales; and the High Court should have formulated their proposition thus : a tax on the first sale of goods is so connected with their production that it cannot properly be described as, and is not in fact, a tax on sale.(Para 8). The expression "duties of excise" even in Australia is limited to duties imposed in connection with the production of a commodity alone. On the contrary in Australia all taxes on the sale of commodities are, or may be regarded as duties of excise; but whether this be so or not, it is clear that (1926) 38 C.L.R. 408 cannot be treated as having the conclusive authority which the High Court of Madras seems to have attributed to it. Under the Australian Constitution power to impose duties of excise is the exclusive right of the Commonwealth Parliament; the residuary taxing power remains in the States. In the Indian Constitution Act, the whole of the taxing power in this particular sphere is expressly apportioned between the Centre and Provinces, to the one being assigned the power to impose duties of excise, to the other taxes on the sale of goods it is natural enough when considering the ambit of an express power in relation to an unspecified residuary power, to give a broad interpretation to the former at the expense of the latter.(Para 12). The Central Legislature should be regarded as having power "to impose duties on excisable articles before they become part of the general stock of the province, that is to say, at the stage of manufacture or production, and the Provincial Legislature an exclusive power to impose a tax on sales thereafter".(Para 16). The appeal will be allowed and the case remitted to the High Court of Madras with directions to substitute a decree dismissing the respondents' suit.(Para 17).

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